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Social inequalities are known to relate to a wide range 
of negative psychological and social effects, such as health 
problems, educational underperformance, violence and 
many more (Moya & Fiske, 2017; Sutton, Cichocka, & 
van der Toorn, 2012; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2017). People in 
a socially disadvantaged position could experience threat 
to basic social motives of control, certainty or a positive 
identity of the ingroup (Fiske, 2010). How do groups who 
suffer from low social power or status cope with such 
threats? So far, research related mainly to social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) focused on this issue and 
outlined a range of behavioral coping strategies (e.g., social 
mobility, social creativity or social competition). More 
recently, the issue of group-based emotional responses to 
perceived social threats has been explored more in depth 
(Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 2016). 
This line of research emphasized the role of emotion 
regulation processes in the context of conflict resolution 
and reconciliation (Č ehajić -Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, 
& Halperin, 2016; Halperin, 2014). However, not much 
attention has been paid so far to the dynamics of emotional 
reaction to social disadvantage and powerlessness 
(Vollhardt & Twali, 2016). In our research, we attempt to 
integrate insights from the social identity approach and 
research on instrumental emotion regulation to understand 
how people cope with group level disadvantage (Spears 
et al., 2011). Specifically, we examine the dynamics of 
emotional reactions associated with powerlessness as 
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a function of its perceived legitimacy. Also, we explore 
whether emotional processes that reduce or maintain 
negative emotions can serve the goal of coping with 
powerlessness by promoting collective action. 
From powerlessness to group-based coping 
mechanisms
For four decades, social identity theory has provided 
an influential framework for understanding how groups 
deal with social disadvantage (Tajfel & Turner 1979; 1986). 
This approach has paid attention to aspects of the social 
context, and in particular whether the status disadvantage 
is perceived as stable and legitimate. Unstable and 
illegitimate status disadvantages give the hope and scope 
for social change, which allow group members to contest 
their disadvantage openly and directly. Stable and legitimate 
group disadvantage is by comparison more problematic and 
difficult to deal with, but as we elaborate below, we consider 
this case just as interesting from the perspective of coping. 
Despite the importance of motivational principles 
in social identity theory, and the affective core of social 
identity, emotions and emotional theorizing were absent 
in its original formulation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Although the development of intergroup emotion theory 
(Smith, 1993) built heavily on the social identity approach 
(including self-categorization theory), the initial focus of 
this theory was to explain the different emotional forms of 
discrimination and prejudice rather than to explain coping 
with low status or powerlessness. 
The stress and coping literature, and specifically 
the theoretical framework of Lazarus and colleagues 
(e.g., Lazarus, 1991) provided an important source of 
analysis that can be transferred to the intergroup domain. 
Although originally aimed at more interpersonal contexts, 
the problems of group disadvantage can also be cast in 
these terms. In the dual path model of van Zomeren and 
colleagues (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; 
van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Leach, 2008) Lazarus’s 
distinction between emotion-focused and problem focused-
-coping is applied to the intergroup level. In this model 
emotions (like anger) are seen as a means to collective 
action, which is just one, and perhaps and not always the 
easiest route to coping with disadvantage (van Zomeren, 
Leach & Spears, 2012). van Zomeren’s theoretical model 
conceptualizes collective action against social disadvantage 
as the outcome of two distinct processes – one emotional, 
based on group anger related to appraised unfairness 
and external blame (emotion focused approach coping 
in Lazarus’ terms) and the other instrumental, based on 
perceived group efficacy and appraised coping potential 
for social change (Lazarus’ problem focused approach 
coping) (van Zomeren et al., 2012). The model predicts 
that people will engage in approach (rather than avoidance) 
coping when there is some potential for social change, 
that is the social disadvantage is appraised as unfair and 
group goals are appraised as achievable (van Zomeren 
et al., 2012). Thus, perceived illegitimacy of power 
relations or social disadvantage between groups should 
promote more instrumental, problem focused coping. On 
the other hand, stable and legitimate social disadvantage 
would limit individuals’ approach coping and promote 
avoidance based coping, such as denial of the disadvantage 
or disengagement from the group identity (Ellemers, 1993; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
However, recent research suggests a possible alterna-
tive to this classical view on how people deal with 
legitimate vs. illegitimate power asymmetries and low 
status. This line of research suggests, in contrast with 
classical social identity theory, that stable low status can 
also be especially threatening, prompting group members 
to resort to even more radical action, as it is the case of the 
“nothing to lose” effect (Kamans Spears, Otten, Gordijn, & 
Livingstone, 2013; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje & Manstead, 
2006; Spears et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). In a similar 
vein, some previous research has shown that disadvantage 
that is accepted as legitimate by the in-group itself is 
especially threatening, in particular among those committed 
to the group, which can motivate them to challenge this 
situation (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, Spears, & de 
Lemus, 2017; Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman, 
2010). Although social identity theory would again predict 
less action here, given the constrained social reality of the 
legitimate low status groups, coping strategies that promote 
resistance may be more functional than simply accepting 
the disadvantage. Thus, it seems plausible that when 
power asymmetries are portrayed as legitimate, people still 
actively fight against their unfavorable situation but not 
by confronting directly the outgroup but by strengthening 
the ingroup ties and mobilization of group-based resources 
(such as social support). Two questions arise here – firstly, 
whether such an active way of coping can be observed in 
powerless groups whose position is viewed as legitimized 
and secondly, whether instrumental maintenance of 
negative emotions can serve this function. We assume 
that this type of emotion focused coping strategy can be 
observed in powerless and low status legitimate groups 
and that negative emotions can in fact serve the final goal 
of promoting collective action. Further on we discuss the 
role of emotions and emotion regulation processes in the 
course of dealing with powerlessness, the legitimate and 
illegitimate one.
(Il)Legitimacy of power/status relations 
and the regulation of negative emotions
The relation between powerlessness and the expression 
of negative emotions does not seem to be straightforward 
and easy to determine without taking into account the social 
context and the motivational functions of specific emotions 
(Petkanopoulou, Willis, & Rodríguez -Bailón, 2017). The 
influence of powerlessness on people’s emotional and 
behavioral responses depends largely on the legitimacy 
appraisals of these power differences (Lammers, Galinsky, 
Gordijn, & Otten, 2008; Martorana, Galinsky, & Rao, 2005; 
Rodríguez-Bailón, Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2000). For example, 
a key appraisal for anger is perceived unfairness and 
illegitimacy of power relations (e.g., Nugier, Niedenthal, 
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Brauer, & Checkroun, 2007; van Zomeren et al., 2004). 
Anger also motivates collective action tendencies, especially 
if the disadvantaged situation is perceived as illegitimate 
(van Zomeren et al., 2004; 2012). According to social 
identity theory, status and power differences perceived 
as illegitimate are associated with stronger social change 
intentions and a tendency to increase social distance 
between the ingroup and outgroup (Lammers et al., 2012; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the other hand, fear and anxiety 
are likely to be emotional responses to low power or status 
groups, particularly when power and status differences 
are seen as legitimized (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). 
However, more recent studies show that the type of emotion 
experienced by powerless legitimate group members 
depends largely on the appraisal of injustice and the external 
vs. internal source of disadvantage (other-blaming vs. self-
blaming) (Spears et al., 2010; van Zomeren et al., 2012). 
It seems that when the power differences are externally 
legitimized but still perceived as unfair and imposed by 
the outgroup or system, anger and other active coping 
based emotions can be experienced, whereas when power 
differences are attributed to the group’s failure or inability 
to gain power then less agitated negative emotions such as 
sadness or dissatisfaction are experienced (Spears et al., 
2010; Walker & Smith, 2002). 
The perception of legitimacy of an unequal power/
status distribution has therefore direct consequences for 
the type of emotions experienced. It seems important, 
however, to interpret those emotional states in a functional 
framework, that is considering emotions as means to 
achieve the goal of changing the disadvantaged position 
of one’s group (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; van Zomeren 
et al., 2012). From this perspective, features of experienced 
emotions will depend on the importance and attainability of 
this goal. Negative emotions signal that more effort needs 
to be directed to the current goal (Carver & Scheier, 2009).
Assumed that group members perceive the value of 
changing their disadvantaged position, the difficulty to 
achieve the change might be an important factor that allows 
us to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate power 
differences. Based on the energization theory of motivation 
it can be predicted that the more difficult a task is the more 
effort and energization is required to do it (Brehm & Self, 
1989). Effort investment should increase up to a point in 
which the task is still perceived as doable, beyond that 
effortful processing decreases (Wright, 1992). However, 
research on personal control deprivation shows that people 
who experience prolonged uncontrollability, often persist in 
task performance even when there is no clear solution to it, 
paying the cost of decreased mental capacity and flexibility 
(Bukowski & Kofta, 2017). We think that those basic 
findings can also shed light on the emotional dynamics 
of reactions to (il)legitimate powerlessness and low status 
groups. For example, as stated before, experienced anger 
stemming from an appraisal of unfairness might serve 
the goal of promoting change in the social structure and 
reestablishing a desired position of one’s ingroup. This 
goal should be more difficult to achieve when the power 
differences are viewed as legitimate and relatively more 
attainable when there is already a shared perception of 
illegitimacy. We propose that the regulation of negative 
affective states (reduction vs. maintenance) is a key process 
related to goal setting and striving.
Do negative emotional states dissipate or are they 
maintained over time in powerless groups? Emotional 
regulation may weaken, intensify or maintain emotion 
depending on assessable goals (Gross & Thompson, 
2007). Traditionally, emotion regulation processes were 
investigated on a personal or interpersonal level but 
recently increasing attention has been paid to emotion 
regulation processes in intergroup contexts (Goldenberg 
et al., 2016). This research focused on the role of group-
based goals as possible determinants of various emotion 
regulation strategies. Still, the role of emotion regulation 
processes in dealing with threats arising from status 
disadvantage, is a novel issue that so far received scarce 
attention (see Shnabel & Ulrich, 2016; Vollhardt & Twali, 
2016). For this reason, we will now briefly describe the 
possible links between perceived power (il)legitimacy and 
emotional regulation processes.
It is a well-documented finding across psychological 
science that people tend to maintain a positive emotional 
state and improve their negative emotional states (Larsen, 
2000). Similarly, in the intergroup area, situations that 
evoke social threats to ingroup identity and agency motivate 
ingroup members to use cognitive and behavioral strategies 
to restore their threatened motives (Ellemers, 1993; 
Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
However, in some situations group members might prefer 
to maintain negative emotional states than substituting 
them by positive ones if they believe that this strategy 
can better serve their goals. For example, anger could 
motivate negative reactions towards the outgroup (e.g., 
stereotyping, blaming etc.), which in turn helps to alleviate 
negative emotions, but it could also motivate action against 
the perpetrator group. In the present research, we adopt 
a socio-functional perspective, which views emotions as 
adaptive responses that are tailored to deal with problems 
of physical and social survival (Keltner & Gross, 1999). In 
this account, negative emotions can be regulated (reduced 
or maintained) depending on specific goals and context 
at hand. Thus, in order to achieve relevant personal or 
social goals people might strategically maintain negative 
emotions, if they are deemed useful means to desired ends 
(Tamir, 2009). For example, Tamir and Ford (2011) showed 
that people motivated to confront (vs. cooperate with) their 
partner increased their anger before negotiations to attain 
instrumental benefits. People might be also motivated 
to experience negative emotions in intergroup contexts, 
if they perceive them as serving an instrumental goal 
(e.g. possible change and a better future for fellow group 
members; see Goldenberg et al., 2016). Hence, maintenance 
of negative emotional states can be a mobilizing response 
when obtaining one’s group goal (e.g. equality or justice) is 
perceived as difficult.
In the context of intergroup relations, the goal to 
achieve social change is related to the perceived (il)
legitimacy of power relations (e.g., Martorana et al., 2005; 
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Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
1986). It can be assumed that when power differences 
are appraised as stable and difficult to change, then 
negative emotional reactions should persist, focusing 
the ingroup members on the goal of changing the 
disadvantaged position of their group. This assumption 
would be consistent with some research showing that 
high motivational intensity can induce different affective 
states (such as anger but also fear) which as a consequence 
narrow people’s attention and can their focus on the desired 
goal (Harmon-Jones, Gable, Prince, 2013). It seems also 
functional that negative emotions associated with power 
asymmetries do not dissipate, but are maintained over time 
to motivate action. Therefore, we expect that negative 
emotions (especially related to anger or fear) would be 
maintained over time in legitimate powerless groups.
In order to understand the functions of reduced vs. 
maintained negative emotional states it seems important 
to look at the behavioral consequences of legitimate vs. 
illegitimate lack of power. When the goals of the powerless 
are not directly related to changing their position in the 
social structure, illegitimate lack of power promoted more 
effective goal setting, higher flexibility during goal striving 
and stronger persistence in the face of difficulties (Willis, 
Guinote, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010). However, recent 
research also showed that when women’s group identity 
and agency is threatened by presenting social inequalities 
as stable and legitimized by the system then different forms 
of motivated resistance could be observed (e.g., stronger 
persistence on an ability task and support for collective 
action; de Lemus, Bukowski, Spears, & Telga, 2015). 
Women also expressed stronger negative emotions after 
being exposed to stable power differences between men 
and women and showed stronger implicit ingroup bias 
(de Lemus, Spears, Lupiáñez, Bukowski, & Moya, 2017). 
However, the role of outgroup stereotypes in the course of 
group-based emotion regulation is still not clear. 
Stereotyping and the instrumental regulation 
of negative emotions
How might emotion regulation processes operate 
in the context of legitimate vs. illegitimate power/status 
differences and what factors might facilitate it? On the one 
hand, stereotypes can have a justifying function for social 
inequalities, even if this is in conflict with group interests 
(Kay & Jost, 2003). On the other hand, stereotypes can 
be used instrumentally to challenge the existing power 
disadvantage (de Lemus, Spears, Bukowski, Moya, & 
Lupiáñez, 2013; Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, & 
Dolnik, 2000). This use of stereotypes would seem most 
likely in the case of illegitimate disadvantage, when 
derogation of the out-group seems justified. However, 
precisely the opportunity for this stereotypic derogation 
may alleviate the negative emotions (Fein & Spencer, 
1997), potentially dismantling the emotional basis for 
action. Paradoxically this may be less likely when the status 
disadvantage is legitimate and the scope for negative out-
group stereotyping is more constrained by social reality. 
In this case, maintaining negative emotions may be quite 
functional because legitimate low power is the context 
where the group is most threatened and needs to challenge 
this situation. Recent studies on motivational responses to 
illegitimate vs. legitimate status differences revealed that 
low status elicited more threat (less challenge) when it was 
presented as legitimate vs. illegitimate (Scheepers, 2017). 
Although fear is often associated more with avoidance than 
approach, there is some evidence that it can also motivate 
radical forms of resistance and group action when the 
ingroup disadvantage is seen as desperate (i.e. the “nothing 
to lose” effect: Kamans et al., 2013; Jiménez-Moya, Spears, 
Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, 2015). In fact, people 
who are exposed to anxiety inducing threats, experience 
a sense of uncontrollability, and react with anger towards an 
outgroup perceived as enemy, ultimately showing a boost in 
motivation (Motro & Sullivan, 2016). Thus, although anger 
and fear are often seen as contrasting emotions, they may 
both interact when feeling low power (or control) and be 
relevant for the phenomenology of disadvantaged groups. 
Both may also motivate various forms of collective action.
Overview of predictions and studies
We predict that when an unequal power distribution 
is framed as illegitimate, ingroup members might 
experience negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear, anxiety) 
but that these may reduce over time, especially when 
there is the opportunity to acknowledge this illegitimacy 
through stereotyping of the out-group. By contrast, when 
an unequal power distribution is framed as legitimate, 
these negative emotions will likely be maintained over 
time, as they are unlikely to be alleviated by stereotyping, 
which may reinforce the status disadvantage. We also 
assume that maintaining negative emotions will result in 
stronger support for action tendencies to oppose outgroup 
members and weaker support for tendencies to cooperate 
with them. Additionally, we assume that higher levels of 
threat and fear induced in legitimate powerless groups 
would lead to a more focused (thus also less dispersed 
and flexible) goal setting process, which could facilitate 
social change.
We tested these predictions in two studies. In 
Study 1 we manipulated the legitimacy of power/status 
asymmetries between two groups of students that differ in 
terms of status (psychology and social education students) 
using a fictitious newspaper article. After that participants 
described the outgroup or a non-social object, in order to 
test whether stereotyping of the outgroup specifically leads 
to the down regulation of negative emotions. We expected 
that when participants in a legitimized, disadvantaged 
power situation are asked to stereotype a higher status 
outgroup, they will maintain their initial level of negative 
emotions because of the threatening intergroup context. 
This should not occur in the illegitimate powerless group. 
In Study 2, we additionally used a stereotyping activation 
method that made salient the competence dimension of the 
outgroup stereotype, in order to check whether threat from 
the outgroup is indeed a factor that explains maintenance 
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of negative emotions in the legitimate powerless group. We 
also assessed possible consequences of perceived threat 
for group efficacy perceptions and how the manipulation 
affects goal setting processes aimed at changing the 
disadvantaged position of the ingroup.
Study 1
At the individual level, the appraisals of legitimacy of 
the situation can be different than those expressed publicly 
by the ingroup or outgroups (Spears et al., 2010). We argue 
that when the cause of the negative emotions (i.e., the 
power disadvantage) is presented as illegitimate, a public 
acknowledgement of illegitimacy could help to regulate 
the negative emotions. However, when the illegitimacy is 
not publicly acknowledged and the situation is described 
as justified, the initial negative emotions might not be 
reduced, but maintained. In this context, the instrumental 
function of emotion regulation (reduction vs. maintenance 
of negative affect) might consist in facilitating the 
contestation of the socially legitimized but still unfavorable 
power distribution for the ingroup. When high status 
outgroup stereotypes are salient, the illegitimacy, but not 
legitimacy, will lead to a reduction of negative emotions 
over time. Legitimacy on the contrary, will lead to the 
maintenance of negative affect as a way to be ready for 
potential future actions. If this is the case, we think that 
the possibility to express outgroup stereotypes should 
increase the intergroup salience leading to the activation 
of more confrontational and less cooperative behavioral 
tendencies in the legitimate condition. Therefore, we expect 
an interaction between legitimacy and stereotyping, such 
that perceived (il)legitimacy will influence affect regulation 
only when outgroup stereotypes are used. Further, in 
Study 1 we look at specific emotions of anger and fear that 
might be related to the legitimacy appraisals and linked to 
behavioral tendencies to change the disadvantaged situation 
(e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008). 
We predict that in a disadvantaged low status position anger 
and fear are prone to be activated and the reduction of their 
intensity should be related to weaker tendencies to oppose 
the outgroup and stronger tendencies to cooperate with it. 
We did not have specific predictions whether anger, fear 
or a more general negative emotional state will drive the 
behavioral effects, that is why we included the analyses on 
the negative emotion score as well as on the anger and fear 
subscales.
Method
Participants and design 
One hundred twenty-six Social Education students 
(101 women and 21 men, 4 did not indicate their sex) from 
the University of Granada participated voluntarily in the 
study (Mean age = 21.95, SD = 5.08). 
The experiment constituted a 3 (Legitimacy: illegiti-
mate vs. legitimate vs. control) x 2 (Stereotyping: 
outgroup stereotyping vs. object evaluation) x 2 (Emotions 
time-point: before vs. after the stereotyping manipulation) 
design with repeated measures on the last factor. 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were presented with a fictitious newspaper 
article about the job market and their future career 
opportunities. 
Legitimacy manipulation 
The article in the newspaper stated that there is 
a conflict of interests between social education and 
psychology students with regard to the assessment of their 
skills and academic preparation that guarantees a job after 
finishing the studies. Further on, it read that recent research 
has shown that 95% of the high power, better paid posts 
(directors and leaders) in the educational sector is occupied 
by psychologists. In the illegitimate powerless condition the 
article stated, that this situation is perceived as unjust and 
unfair. In the legitimate powerless condition, the situation 
was described as justified by some studies that prove 
a better preparation of psychology students to perform 
important management functions and leadership positions. 
The text in the control condition (equally powerless) stated 
that the power distribution between the social education 
and psychology students was not unfair. Instead, it was 
emphasized that both groups of students are in a difficult 
position on the labor market due to the economic crisis 
and that both might have to struggle in the coming years in 
order to get a job.
Emotion measure
After the legitimacy manipulation, all participants 
were asked to fill out an emotional state scale related 
to the news they had just read (Zuckerman & Lubin, 
1985). This scale entails three subscales for negative 
emotions that measure anger, anxiety and sadness related 
emotions (7 items; the instruction read: “Please indicate 
on a scale ranging from 1 – not at all, to 7 – extremely, 
to what extent you experience in this moment a particular 
emotion from the ones listed below when you recall the 
situation previously described in the newspaper article”). 
The average for those three subscales was used as the pre-
stereotyping negative emotion measure (Time 1; α = .80). 
We also assessed separate subscales for anger (α = .77) and 
fear (two items, r = .36, p < .001). 
Stereotyping manipulation
Participants were asked to list up to ten attributes 
that they considered typical for psychology students 
(stereotyping condition) or a socially irrelevant object 
(laptop computer; non-stereotyping condition). Later on, 
participants were asked to evaluate each of those traits 
on a 7-point scale (-3: very negative to +3: very positive) 
(open ended stereotyping measure; Esses & Zanna, 1995).
After completing this task, participants responded 
again to the emotions measure (Time 2; negative emotions: 
α = .87; anger: α = .85; fear: r = .51, p < .001). 
Action tendencies
Subsequently, a set of questions were asked about 
action tendencies towards the outgroup (i.e., psychology 
students) related to the dimensions of facilitation (using 
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a scale ranging from 1 – not at all, to 7 – extremely; e.g.; 
To what extent would you be willing to cooperate with/
help psychology students?) and harm (e.g.; To what extent 
would you be willing to oppose/compete with psychology 
students?) based on the BIAS map theory (Cuddy, Fiske, 
& Glick, 2008). 
As a manipulation check, participants were asked to 
write a short summary of the newspaper article that they 
had read before. Finally, they were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Means for all negative emotions in Time 1 (i.e., pre-
-stereotyping measure) and Time 2 (i.e. post-stereotyping 
measure), as well as means for anger and fear subscales 
in T1 and T2 were computed. Also, relative indexes of 
emotion regulation (Time 2 – Time 1; negative values 
indicated reduction of negative emotions, positive values 
– enhancement of negative emotions and values close to 
zero – maintenance of emotional states) were computed. 
Five outliers who scored over 3 SD’s on this index were 
excluded from the analyses.
Emotion regulation analyses
We performed an ANOVA analysis with legitimacy 
and stereotyping as between subject factors, and repeated 
measures on emotion time-point. Results showed a main 
effect of emotion time-point (F(1,120) = 32.74, p < 001, 
η²p = .214), which indicated that in general participants 
improved their negative emotional state over time. 
Importantly, results also showed a significant Emotion 
time-point x Stereotyping x Legitimacy interaction, 
F(2,120) = 3.34, p = .039, η²p = .053 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Emotion regulation as a function of power 
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The analysis of the 3-way interaction showed that the 
Stereotyping x Emotion time-point interaction was only 
significant for the legitimate condition (F(1,41) = 5.05, 
p = .03, η²p = .11), but not for the illegitimate or control 
conditions (both Fs < 1, ns). The analysis of the legitimate 
condition revealed a reduction of negative emotions 
from Time 1 (M = 3.03, SD = 0.91) to Time 2 (M = 2.31, 
SD = 1.01) only in the non-stereotyping condition 
(F(1,120) = 24.83, p < .001, η²p = .171), whereas in the 
stereotyping condition emotions were maintained over time 
(Time 1: M = 2.73, SD = 1.15; Time 2: M = 2.69, SD = 1.61; 
F < 1, ns). In the illegitimate powerless condition, there was 
a general reduction of negative emotions (F(1,120) = 18.81, 
p < .001, η²p = .135), from Time 1 (M = 2.63, SD = 1.14) 
to Time 2 (M = 2.16, SD = 1.07) as it was the case for the 
control condition (F(1,120) = 5.02, p = .027, η²p = .04; 
Time 1: M = 2.54, SD = 1.10; Time 2: M = 2.29, SD = 1.10). 
Analyses performed for specific negative emotions 
revealed a marginally significant interaction effect for 
anger, F(2,120) = 2.87, p = .061, η²p = .046. The pattern was 
consistent with the general negative emotion score that 
showed maintenance of anger related emotions but only 
in the legitimate powerless condition when the outgroup 
stereotype was salient. The interaction for the fear was not 
significant (F < 1).
Behavioral tendencies
We analyzed the effects of stereotyping and legitimacy 
factors on the four action tendencies toward outgroup 
members measured (help, cooperate, oppose, exclude) in 
a MANOVA design, including legitimacy and stereotyping 
as between subjects factor and emotion time-point as 
a within factor. The interaction Stereotyping x Legitimacy 
was significant (Roy’s Largest Root Statistics: .097, 
F(4,116) = 2.83, p = .028, η²p = .089). Univariate analyses 
indicated that the effect was driven by differences 
in the tendency to oppose (F(2,119) = 3.54, p = .032, 
η²p = .056) and cooperate (F(2,118) = 4.14, p = .018, 
η²p = .066). The analysis of this interaction showed that 
in the illegitimate powerless condition (F(1,118) = 8.18, 
p < .01) participants perceived a stronger tendency to 
cooperate with the outgroup when they were given the 
opportunity to stereotype them (M = 4.45, SD = 0.89) 
than when they described an object (M = 3.65, SD = 1.19). 
No effects were found on cooperation for the legitimate 
and the control conditions (both Fs < 1, ns). On the 
contrary, results for the tendency to oppose occurred 
in the legitimate powerless condition (F(1,118) = 5.84, 
p = .017), indicating that participants tended to oppose 
the outgroup relatively more when they were giving the 
opportunity to stereotype them (M = 1.94, SD = .94) than 
participants in the no stereotyping condition (M = 1.28; 
SD = .61). It is important to note that overall tendencies to 
oppose the outgroup where much lower than to cooperate 
with them.
Moderated mediation analyses
In order to check whether the effects of stereotyping 
and legitimacy on behavioral tendencies were mediated 
by the regulation of negative emotions, we conducted two 
separate moderated mediation analyses on opposition and 
cooperation as dependent variables (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). First, we focused on the regulation of negative 
emotions as a potential mediator and predicted that the 
effect of Legitimacy x Stereotyping on opposition and 
cooperation would be mediated by the negative emotion 
regulation (reduction vs. maintenance). A negative emotion 
difference score (Time 2 – Time 1), for which negative 
scores indicate reduction of negative emotions and positive 
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scores indicate enhancement of negative emotions was 
introduced to the model.
Since the legitimacy variable had three levels, we 
applied polynominal contrasts (of legitimacy (Contrast 1: 
Illegitimate condition and Control = 0.5 and Legitimate = -1; 
Contrast 2: Illegitimate = -0.5, Legitimate = 0.5 and 
Control = 0) and we used the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 
2013; Model 7). The results showed that the moderation 
effect of legitimacy and stereotyping on the tendency 
to oppose the outgroup was not mediated by negative 
emotions using 10 000 samples bootstrapping (BCa 95% 
CI [-0.273; 0.020]; SE = .072). However, the moderated 
mediation analysis was significant for cooperation (BCa 
95% CI [0.003; 0.255]; SE = .064. The analyses of the 
conditional indirect effects of stereotyping on cooperation 
through negative emotions were significant in the legitimate 
condition (BCa 95% CI [-0.247; -0.004]; SE = .061) but 
not in the illegitimate and control conditions (BCa 95% 
CI [-0.028; 0.037]; SE = .016). This means that in the 
legitimate condition participants who stereotype the 
outgroup, and do not reduce their negative emotions 
over time, tend to cooperate less with the outgroup. We 
performed analogous analyses for anger, fear and sadness 
subscales, the results mirrored the pattern for the negative 
emotions score, yet we obtained a full mediation only for 
the anger subscale (BCa 95% CI [0.003; 0.245]; SE = .060).
Discussion
The results of this study show a gradual dissipation of 
negative emotions in the illegitimate condition. However, 
the regulation of negative emotions happened in the 
non-stereotyping condition as well as in the stereotyping 
condition which might indicate that any type of evaluation 
process between the first and second measurement of 
emotions successfully deployed participants’ attention 
and lead to gradual decrease of negative emotions. This 
reflects the fact that the illegitimacy of the unequal 
power/status distribution is widely acknowledged and 
some actions are already taking place (as was specified 
in the article newspaper manipulation) and therefore, 
personal (emotional) involvement is not so necessary 
(Darley & Latané, 1968). In line with this argument, when 
a situation is portrayed as overtly illegitimate, it also tends 
to be perceived as unstable (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Our 
results suggest that in the illegitimate condition, when the 
intergroup setting is salient (i.e., stereotyping condition), 
those participants who reduce their initial level of negative 
emotions (especially anger), are the ones who are also more 
motivated to cooperate with the outgroup.
By contrast, we found that in the powerless legitimate 
condition outgroup stereotyping prevents participants 
from reducing their negative emotions, whereas describing 
a non-social object leads to a decrease in negative 
emotions. Apparently activating outgroup stereotypes 
increases the salience of the intergroup context, and 
therefore, the disadvantaged ingroup position. Further, 
it seems that the legitimacy of such power asymmetries, 
leads to maintenance of negative emotions (anger) and 
higher tendencies to oppose or confront the outgroup. 
Presenting the power distribution as legitimate, according 
to external sources does not mean that this is accepted by 
ingroup members (Spears et al., 2010). Indeed, the threat 
of such legitimacy seems to maintain negative emotions 
over an extended period of time, fostering action tendencies 
that challenge the power inequality. This is shown by the 
moderated mediation effect, which suggests that those 
participants in the legitimate condition that stereotype the 
outgroup (i.e., high salience of a high-status outgroup) 
and do not regulate their emotions, are the ones that are 
less keen on cooperating with them. Hence, the (lack of) 
emotion regulation has the function of helping them to 
contest (or at least, not help) the powerful outgroup.
Study 2
The previous study revealed that in salient outgroup 
stereotype conditions the dynamics of emotional reactions 
and behavioral intentions to address power inequality 
differs depending on legitimacy. However, we still know 
little about the relevant appraisal related to the existing 
power asymmetry in legitimate vs. illegitimate conditions 
(e.g., threat or challenge) and how the emotional regulation 
process influences perceived group efficacy and collective 
action goal-setting. Therefore, in this study we focused 
on specific emotions of anger, fear and anxiety, and also 
appraisals of threat related to the power disadvantage and 
measure the effects of those on predictors of behavioral 
tendencies that promote social change. Additionally, in 
this study we kept constant the stereotyping measure 
across conditions and manipulated the legitimacy factor 
(legitimate vs. illegitimate) between groups.
Method
Participants
Participants were eighty-six undergraduate social work 
students (70 women, 15 men and 1 did not indicate the 
sex; Mean age = 20.61, SD = 3.81) from the University of 
Granada, who received course credit for their participation.
Materials and procedure 
As in Study 1, participants read a fictitious newspaper 
article describing the situation of the job market and their 
future career opportunities. 
Legitimacy manipulation 
The bogus newspaper article presented was the same 
as the one used in Study 1, stating that recent polls showed 
that social workers had worse job prospects in the social 
care market and were worse paid than psychologists. 
Emotion measure 
After reading the fictitious article, negative emotions 
(including anger, fear and anxiety, sadness), all related 
to the previously described situation, were measured 
(Zuckerman & Lubin, 1985). We calculated an index of 
negative emotions at this point of measurement, Time 1, 
(α = .80) as well as anger (α = .69), fear and anxiety (r = .23, 
p = .048).
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Outgroup stereotyping measure 
Once participants reported how they felt towards 
the disadvantaged ingroup situation, they were presented 
with a stereotyping measure of the outgroup. We decided 
to apply a different type of stereotyping measure than in 
the previous study, because the open-ended measure used 
before did not allow us to control for the type of image of 
the psychology outgroup (i.e., people could categorize and 
evaluate psychologists using very different traits). Thus, 
here we focused participants’ attention on competence and 
warmth dimensions of social perception, highlighting the 
high status (competence) of the outgroup. Participants were 
asked to what extent they perceived psychology students as 
competent, intelligent, untidy, ineffective sociable, warm, 
introverted, and unkind on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much). In addition, participants evaluated each trait 
on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).
Right after completing this task, participants 
responded again to the emotions measure (Time 2; negative 
emotions: α = .84; anger: α = .75; fear and anxiety: r = .33, 
p = .004).
Group efficacy and collective actions measures
Further, we measured group efficacy as a proxy for 
collective action intentions (cf. van Zomeren et al., 2004). 
Specifically, we distinguished between two types of group 
efficacy (see Hornsey et al., 2006; Saab, Tausch, Spears, 
& Cheung, 2015): political group efficacy was measured 
with five items (α = .89; e.g., I think that social work 
students can successfully stand up for their rights), and 
identity consolidation efficacy was measured with three 
items (α = .88; e.g., I think together, social work students 
will be able to build a movement for equal facilities and 
opportunities among students.).
Participants were also presented with six items aimed 
at measuring the readiness to engage in collective actions 
(α = .73; e.g., I would attend a demonstration against the 
inequality between social workers and psychologist). In 
addition, in a separate task, they were asked to write down 
all the different actions they could think of, that could help 
to diminish the inequality between their ingroup and the 
outgroup. The number of means to the goal was considered 
to be an indication of idea generating fluency and the 
number of new ideas an index of flexibility of means 
generation (Willis et al., 2010). 
We also measured the extent to which participants 
perceived the disadvantage situation as a future threat with 
two items (e.g., I feel anxious regarding the future of social 
work students) or challenge (e.g., I think the social work 
students can consider their current situation as a challenge) 
for the ingroup.
Finally, participants were asked to write a short 
summary of the newspaper article that served as a memory 
check of the applied legitimacy manipulation. At the end of 
the study, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
We excluded nine participants who failed the 
manipulation check question, one who did not believe the 
bogus article, and one who reported vision problems. We 
ran ANOVAs with illegitimacy as a between participants 
factor and general and specific negative emotion scores 
(negative emotions, anger, fear, sadness; measured before 
and after the stereotype measure) as within participant 
repeated measures. There was no significant interaction 
effect between legitimacy and emotion measurement for 
the overall negative emotion score (F < 1). We did separate 
analyses for each specific emotion subscale and found an 
interaction effect between legitimacy and emotion time-
point only for the fear subscale1, F(1,73) = 4.08, p = .047, 
η²p = .053. As depicted on Figure 2, the level of fear for 
participants in illegitimate powerless conditions decreased 
significantly over time (MTime1 = 2.92; SDTime1 = 1.59, 
MTime1 = 2.44; SDTime1 = 1.48) (Sidak’s pairwise comparison: 
F(1,72) = 4.45, p = .038, η²p = .058). This result is in line 
with the results of Study 1, showing reduction of negative 
emotions over time in the illegitimate group. However, in 
the legitimate powerless group we found no significant 
differences between fear measurements over time 
(MTime1 = 3.29; SDTime1 = 1.59, MTime1 = 3.45; SDTime1 = 1.87, 
F < 1), indicating maintenance of fear in time. The 
interaction effect for anger was not significant (Fs < 1).
Figure 2. Fear regulation as a function of power 
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We ran additional correlational analyses to check 
whether perceived outgroup competence (implying 
potential threat in a competitive context) is related to 
expression of negative emotions. Interestingly, we found 
a negative correlation between the level of competence 
associated with the outgroup (psychology students) and 
anxiety regulation only in legitimate conditions, (r = -.32; 
p < .05). This means that the more competent the outgroup 
was perceived to be by the participants, the less they 
reduced their level of fear over time. In the illegitimate 
condition, we found a positive correlation between the 
perceived intelligence of the outgroup members and anxiety 
regulation (r = .36; p < .05), which means that the more 
intelligent the outgroup was perceived to be the stronger the 
initial anxiety level was reduced.
1  As in Study 1, we report here the interaction for the fear subscale 
score that consisted of the mean for fear and anxiety measures. However, 
since the correlation between the two items at Time 1 was weak, we also 
performed separate analyses on single items of fear and anxiety and found 
that the significant interaction effect was driven by the emotion of fear, not 
by anxiety.
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Further, to check the effect of the legitimacy variable 
on participants’ threat and challenge appraisals, we ran an 
ANOVA analysis including legitimacy as the independent 
variable and the perception of threat or challenge as the 
dependent variables. Results showed an interaction 
effect of legitimacy and threat appraisals (F(1,73) = 4.88, 
p = .03, η²p = .06), which indicated that participants in 
legitimate powerless conditions reported higher levels of 
threat regarding the disadvantage (M = 5.14; SD = 1.23) 
than participants in the illegitimate condition (M = 4.43; 
SD = 1.37). There was no significant difference for 
challenge appraisals (F(1,73) = 1.31, ns). 
We did not find any effect of the legitimacy factor on 
group efficacy measures (F < 1, ns). We also analyzed the 
willingness to take part in collective action as a function 
of legitimacy and did not find any significant effect (F < 1, 
ns). However, we found an effect of legitimacy on the 
number of means generated by participants to fight against 
the in-group disadvantage (F(1,73) = 12.83, p = .001, 
η²p = .15). Specifically, this indicated that participants in 
the illegitimate condition generated more diverse ways of 
stopping the inequality (M = 2.00; SD = 1.49) compared to 
participants in legitimate conditions (M = .87; SD = 1.25).
Importantly, in order to check the role of threat 
appraisals in the impact of power disadvantage legitimacy 
on group efficacy perceptions, we performed a mediation 
analysis, in which threat was the mediating variable 
between legitimacy and group efficacy. Legitimacy 
significantly predicted the threat appraisals (β = .857, 
t = 2.14, p = .036), indicating that higher threat was 
perceived in the legitimate condition, and threat predicted 
the identity consolidation measure of group efficacy 
(β = .244, t = 3.44, p = .001). Even though there was no 
direct effect of legitimacy condition on the group efficacy 
measure, it was justified to test for the indirect effect. 
A bootstrapping procedure (with 10 000 samples) indicated 
that the indirect effect of legitimacy condition on group 
efficacy through threat was .21 with a standard error of 
.12, and 95% confidence interval = [.029, 506] (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2008).
Discussion
In this study, similarly to the previous one, when 
the ingroup’s disadvantage was framed as unfair and 
illegitimate, participants’ fear decreased across time. In 
the legitimate powerless conditions the level of fear was 
maintained over time, which makes the pattern similar 
to the results of Study 1. Further, we also found that 
perceptions of threat regarding the ingroup’s future were 
higher in the legitimate condition. 
The increased level of threat in the legitimate conditions 
might be related to the fact that in this study we increased 
the salience of the high competence level of the outgroup. 
We found that, if the powerful outgroup is perceived as 
competent, fear caused by the disadvantage dissipated only 
when the situation is perceived as unfair. This suggests that 
framing the outgroup as a well-prepared competitor on the 
job market when the inequality is framed as justified, leads 
individuals to maintain the initial level of fear.
Interestingly, we found that perceived threat related 
to the situation of legitimate lack of power played an 
important function in the perception of group efficacy, and 
enhancing identity consolidation and solidarity with other 
members of the ingroup. Therefore, it seems that when 
the situation is portrayed as fair, and difficult to change 
(i.e., legitimate), people turn to their ingroup in order to 
reinforce the existing bonds. 
In terms of potential collective action that would need 
to be taken to change the existing situation, we did not find 
any differences between the illegitimate and legitimate 
powerless groups; the data indicated that in both types 
of situation the average support for all types of collective 
action was very high. However, when participants were 
asked to additionally generate means to advance social 
change, more potential means that could be used to stop the 
disadvantage were generated in the illegitimate condition 
than in the legitimate condition. This result indicates that in 
illegitimate low status positions people can think of more 
ways to protest, whereas in the legitimate one experienced 
threat reduces people’s ability to generate means to achieve 
social change. This strategy of persisting on few collective 
actions might be functional in situations when the group 
does not have the opportunity to try out different types 
of means and just sticks to the ones perceived as most 
effective. This is in line with previous work showing that 
legitimately powerless individuals generate less flexible 
means to their goals, compared to their illegitimate 
counterparts (Willis et al., 2010). 
General discussion
In this research, we focused on the question of how the 
experience of illegitimate vs. legitimate power differences 
influences the negative emotional state of the powerless 
and their tendency to regulate it (to decrease it or maintain 
it). We also checked the role of outgroup stereotypes in the 
emotion regulation process of powerless/low status group 
members. In line with some previous studies on legitimacy 
and power differences (see Spears et al., 2010), we found 
that situations of clear social disadvantage provoke 
negative emotions. When the illegitimacy of the situation 
is acknowledged, the level of negative emotions drops 
over time and salient outgroup stereotypes reinforce this 
process. However, when power asymmetries are presented 
as legitimate, negative emotions (mainly anger and fear-
based) are maintained over time, but only when outgroup 
stereotypes increase the salience of the intergroup context 
and reinforce the threatening nature of a legitimate group 
difference. Interpreting these results in the framework of 
instrumental emotion regulation (Goldenberg et al., 2016; 
Tamir, 2009), we consider the maintenance of negative 
emotions as a form of preparation to the attainment 
of one’s goal (in this case to contest the threat to social 
identity and group agency). Stronger action tendencies to 
oppose the outgroup (Study 1) and increased group efficacy 
via perceived threat (Study 2) in the legitimate powerless 
condition, provide initial support for this assumption 
regarding the instrumental function of negative emotion 
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maintenance. Stereotyping seems to be a precondition for 
these emotion regulation effects, as it increases the salience 
of the intergroup situation, and reinforces the salience of 
a legitimized and thus threatening group disadvantage. 
If no “reminder” of the power disadvantage (i.e., no 
stereotyping) is present, the negative emotions tend to 
dissipate. 
These findings support our initial general assumption 
that in a context of status and power differences, emotion 
regulation is a motivated, goal-driven process. This is 
consistent with an instrumental (utility maximization) 
and motivated account of emotion regulation (Erber, 
Wegner, & Therriault, 1996; Parrott, 1993) rather than the 
hedonistic (pleasure maximization) account (Larsen, 2000). 
Tamir (2009) emphasizes that the utility criteria is related 
to the tendency to maximize future, long-term benefits 
instead of immediate benefits (“feeling good”). Also in 
the intergroup context it has been shown that short term 
negative emotional experiences of anger, frustration or fear 
can be maintained or enhanced in order to pursue long-term 
goals that are relevant for the group (Goldenberg et al., 
2016). Specifically, we place this trade-off between short 
term vs. long term goals in a context of power asymmetries 
between groups. It appears that when the power distribution 
is portrayed as illegitimate, the expectancy of change in 
the short-term might reduce the negative emotions, initially 
evoked by the unequal power distribution. However, when 
the situation is externally legitimized, then the maintenance 
of negative emotions appears as a more functional strategy 
to pursue since any change will require more effort and 
maybe also more radical forms of action. It has been shown 
that people who are expecting to confront a negotiation 
partner try to increase their anger (Tamir & Ford, 2012). 
Our research supports and extends these findings, showing 
that when it gets more difficult to change a disadvantaged 
situation, and a confrontation between groups to pursue 
one’s group goals might be necessary, then the initial level 
of negative emotions is maintained.
The research presented here gives us a preliminary 
insight into the specific emotion regulation dynamics 
in powerless groups and the importance of the depicted 
legitimacy of status differences. The implications of this 
work are especially applicable to societies were the gap 
between the high and low status groups is increasing also 
because of the current economic recession. This research 
suggests that the framing of messages regarding the 
legitimacy of power differences used in the media or by 
political leaders, either as justified or unfair and unjust, 
to inform the public about the discrimination they are 
targets of could clearly affect the ways they react to this 
power disadvantage. As we have shown in the results 
of our studies, those group members who perceive their 
unfavorable situation as unfair reduce their negative 
emotions, especially when a threatening intergroup 
context is salient. However, those who are told that their 
discriminated position is legitimate are the ones who keep 
experiencing negative emotions, which keep them ready 
to confront the outgroup. However, this does not mean 
that the maintenance of negative emotions will lead to 
the development of successful collective action. On the 
contrary, it seems that when the lower status of a group 
is being legitimized by an external source then a sense 
of threat increases, which also inhibits the flexibility of 
thinking about possible alternatives to act for more equal 
treatment. This finding can be interpreted in the light of 
theorizing about the motivational bases of radicalization 
(Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélanger, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi, 
& Gunaratna, 2014). A plausible mechanism that accounts 
for a radicalization process is a strong commitment to the 
focal goal (e.g., change in the disadvantage position), which 
in turn strengthens the association between this goal and 
a specific means perceived as best serving the goal (e.g. 
violence) and devalues alternative goals. Our research 
shows, that higher difficulty in pursuing the goal of social 
change might also restrain the number of means used to 
achieve this goal, which on the one hand might increase 
the strength of the goal – means association and individual 
commitment, but on the other might also enhance more 
rigid and extreme forms of behavior. 
On the contrary, when the low status position is 
portrayed as illegitimate, more cooperative and diverse 
action tendencies are preferred by the low status group 
members, but a drop in negative emotions related to the 
disadvantaged situation can paradoxically decrease the 
persistence of the group’s strivings for social change. This 
finding is consistent with research that revealed decreased 
support for social change by a disadvantaged group as 
a result of positive intergroup contact (i.e. reduced negative 
emotions) and decreased attention to illegitimate aspects 
of inequality (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). 
Therefore, it seems important to be aware of these complex 
effects of legitimacy framings when designing social 
interventions to motivate collective action. 
The perceived stability and scope for change of 
power asymmetries seems to play a crucial role not only 
for emotional regulation but especially for the types of 
actions preferred by ingroup members. Recent research on 
experienced anger and conflict resolution has shown that 
anger increased support for aggressive actions and policies 
but only for people who believe that attitudes and behaviors 
of groups are fixed and cannot change. However, those 
who believed that groups are malleable and can change, 
anger increased support for conciliatory policies (Shuman, 
Halperin, & Tagar, 2017). Thus, anger (or other negative 
emotions) maintained over time do not necessarily need to 
lead to hostile actions, if an appraisal of possible change 
is present, then maintenance or up-regulation of negative 
emotions might in fact also promote constructive ways of 
societal change. 
To sum up, this research sheds some light on the 
applied social implications for social change and resistance 
to power asymmetries. We identified two important 
preconditions of instrumental emotion regulation in a social 
context: legitimacy of power differences and the salience of 
group stereotypes. The specific functions and the efficacy 
of different patterns of emotion regulation in the context 
of collective actions that aim at social change seems an 
important field of further investigation.
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